By the early 1990s ESOPs had become more prevalent in unionized firms than in nonunionized firms. However, little research has been devoted to examine the implications of ESOPs for collective bargaining. Ben-Ner and Jun (1996) examine ESOPs as a buyout option for the union. The ownership share of the typical union ESOP, though, is significantly below 50%. In this paper, we extend the signaling model of Cramton and Tracy (1992) to allow partial ownership stakes by the union. We demonstrate that ESOPs create incentives for unions to become weaker bargainers. As a result, the model predicts that ESOPs will lead to a reduction in the incidence of labor disputes and a reduction in the fraction of these disputes that involve a strike. We examine these predictions using U.S. bargaining data from 1970-1995. The data suggest that ESOPs do increase the efficiency of labor negotiations by reducing dispute rates and shifting the composition of disputes to less costly holdouts. Consistent with improved bargaining efficiency, we find that the announcement of an ESOP leads to a differentially larger stock market reaction to union as compared to nonunion ESOPs.
The growth in Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) in the 1980s fostered a considerable literature into the reasons for their adoption and their impacts on the adopting firm.
ESOPs are "qualified pension" plans that were given explicit recognition and tax incentives by the Employee Retirement Incomes Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 1980, 4,925 ESOP plans existed covering approximately 5.3 million workers. By 1995, the number of plans had increased to 9,232 with coverage of 7.2 million workers. 1 Beginning in 1988, it is possible to identify
ESOPs that are established as a part of a collective bargaining agreement. As of 1991, union
ESOPs covered 1.1 million workers, 6.6% of all private sector workers covered by collective bargaining agreements. In the same year, nonunion ESOPs covered 5.5 million workers, 6.4% of all private sector nonunion workers. 2 That is, by the early 1990s ESOPs had become relatively more prevalent in unionized than in nonunionized firms.
Despite the relative prevalence of ESOPs in unionized firms, there has been very little research on the likely impact of ESOPs on collective bargaining. Ben-Ner and Jun (1996) develop a screening model of bargaining that allows the union to use an ESOP to buy a majority equity stake in the firm. The union's initial offer to the firm during a contract negotiation consists of a wage demand and a buyout price. High valuation firms accept the wage demand with no labor dispute, low valuation firms accept the buyout price again with no labor dispute, and labor disputes screen the remaining intermediate firm types. The buyout option lowers the overall dispute rate and dispute duration by providing the union with an additional screening device. While including ESOPs as a buyout option into a screening model is an interesting theoretical extension, this option is rarely exercised in practice. Figure 1 shows the distribution of ESOP ownership shares in our data of unionized ESOPs. Less than three percent of unionized
ESOPs involve a controlling interest in the firm. 3 The ownership share for the typical union ESOP is substantially below 50%.
In this paper, we examine the impact of ESOPs on the collective bargaining process when the union has a noncontrolling ownership interest in the firm. This conforms to nearly all union ESOPs observed in the data. Rather than focusing on the adoption of an ESOP as a bargaining 1 See DOL (1999). 2 We thank Doug Kruse for tabulating the number of participants in collectively bargained ESOPs from the IRS Form 5500 data.
3 outcome, we focus instead on the effect that an existing ESOP has on current contract negotiations. We do this by extending the signaling model of Cramton and Tracy (1992) to allow the union members to hold an equity stake in the firm. The ESOP causes the union to internalize the costs to the firm associated with labor disputes. As the union's equity stake grows, we show that the union is less likely to select the strike threat and the firm is more likely to accept the union's initial wage offer. ESOPs, then, are predicted to both lower dispute incidence and to shift the composition of disputes from strikes towards holdouts. 4 We test these predictions using a sample of U.S. contract negotiations. Testing the predictions of our model is made difficult by the fact that the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) discontinued collecting data on union contract negotiations in 1995. This means that for most of the bargaining units in our data that adopted an ESOP we have only a couple of contract negotiations following the establishment of the ESOP. With this data limitation in mind, the data indicate a decline in both the incidence of strikes and labor disputes following the adoption of an ESOP. Unionized firms that set up an ESOP appear to have had on average more contentious negotiations with their unions prior to when they established the ESOP. This is evidenced by a higher fraction of labor disputes that take the form of a strike. Following the adoption of the ESOP, these firms experience a reduction in the fraction of labor disputes that take the form of a strike. This shift in the composition of disputes is due to the firms that set up a large versus a small ESOP. The data are suggestive, then, that ESOPs do alter the relative attractiveness to the union of the strike and the holdout threat.
[add para on event study summary]
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe important features of ESOP pension plans. In section 3, we show how ESOPs can be added to a signaling model of labor contract negotiations. In section 4, we discuss the data and present our findings. We conduct an event study of the announcement of a new ESOP in section 5 to explore the implications of ESOPs for the firm's shareholders. The final section contains thoughts for future work.
4 Holdouts are labor disputes in which the union agrees to work under the terms of the expired labor agreement while negotiations continue. In a holdout, the union puts pressure on the firm using a variety of tactics such as "work-to-rule."
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Motives for adoption of ESOPs has been explored in the literature. First, Delaware law makes ESOPs a potential takeover defense. 10 A firm incorporated in Delaware must wait three years after it acquires 15% of the target firm's equity before it can merge with the target, unless
it can obtain a waiver by 85% of the shareholders. In 1989, Polaroid won a decision in Delaware
Court that upheld the company decision to issue 14% of its stock to an ESOP prior to the initiation of a hostile tender offer by Shamrock Holdings. Management may feel that giving voting rights to the union through an ESOP is a way of placing the votes in "friendly" hands (e.g., Myers 1992 and Chaplinsky and Niehaus 1994) . Second, ESOPs were given special tax incentives in order to encourage their adoption. The specifics of these tax benefits, though, are not directly relevant for our purpose. Interested readers can find a detailed discussion in and Scholes and Wolfson (1990) . Finally, ESOPs may improve worker productivity by giving workers and equity stake in the firm. Considerable effort has been devoted to pinning down the productivity effects of profit-sharing in general, and ESOPs in particular [Kruse (1993) , Bell and Kruse (1995) , and Kruse and Blasi (1995) ].
The net impact of ESOPs on a firm's profitability can be assessed by conducting an event study of the announcement effect of a new ESOP. The announcement of a new ESOP on average is viewed in a positive light by investors. Studies have found that the average two day cumulative excess stock return on the day prior to and the day of an ESOP announcement ranges from one to three precent and ]. 
Incorporating ESOPs into a bargaining model
It is often argued that ESOPs serve to improve worker incentives by giving individual workers ownership in the firm. The difficulty with this argument is that any given worker's performance has only a negligible impact on firm profitability. A rational worker, outside of top management, should not alter his/her behavior as a result of an ESOP. However, the impact of even a small ESOP on collective bargaining can be dramatic. This is because collective bargaining avoids the dissipation of incentives that is seen at the individual worker level. As a 10 General Corporation Law SS 203, effective 2 February 1988. 11 This announcement effect captures more than just the tax benefits of an ESOP since it has been documented that stock prices react positively to ESOP adoption even when there is no tax benefit (and adopting companies are takeover targets). See Sellers, Hagan, and Siegel (1994) for further discussion.
6 result, the presence of an ESOP will affect the union's wage demand and its decision to strike.
To assess the impact of an ESOP on collective bargaining we extend the wage bargaining model of Cramton and Tracy (1992) . The model assumes one-sided private information in which the union is uncertain about the firm's profitability. The firm credibly signals its profitability through its willingness to postpone agreement. The union decides how best to pressure the firm by selecting the threat, either strike or holdout. Under holdout, the union continues to work under the terms of the expired labor agreement, but at a reduced level of efficiency. In contrast, striking typically involves substantial disruption of production. We will see that an ESOP impacts not only wages, dispute incidence, and dispute duration, but also the form the dispute takes.
Consider the following stylized labor contract negotiation problem. A union and a firm are bargaining over the wage to be paid during a contract of duration T. Let v be the firm's value of the current union labor force working under a contract of duration T. It is common knowledge that v is drawn from the distribution F with positive density f on an interval of support [l, h] .
However, at the outset of the negotiations only the firm knows the realized value of v.
Negotiations begin with the union selecting a threat θ ∈{H,S}, where H indicates the holdout threat and S indicates the strike threat. The union's threat choice remains in effect until a settlement is reached. Absent an ESOP, in the threat θ, the payoff to the union is x θ and the payoff to the firm is a θ v − b θ , where a θ ∈ [0,1) and b θ ≥ 0. The term 1 − a θ captures the dispute cost in that threat. Define c θ = (b θ − x θ ) / (1 − a θ ) to be the relative payment difference during the threat θ. Since the total payoff in agreement is v and the total payoff during the threat θ is a θ v − b θ + x θ , the "pie" that the union and firm are bargaining over (the difference between the agreement and the threat payoffs ) is (1
. We assume that the pie is positive for all v ∈ [l, h], which implies that c θ > −l.
Let w 0 denote the wage under the expired labor agreement. Since the terms and conditions of the previous labor agreement remain in force during a holdout, the workers continue to be paid w 0 during the holdout, so x H = b H = w 0 and c H = 0. We assume there is some inefficiency during a holdout, a H < 1.
With an ESOP, the union gets a share α of the profits of the firm. This changes the payoff flows both during the threat and after settlement as shown in Figure 2 given the bargaining outcome 〈t, w, θ〉, the union's payoff is
and the firm's payoff is
Notice that the ESOP does not change the firm's incentives. The firm still seeks to maximize its overall profits, despite the fact that a share α of these profits is going to the union. In contrast, the ESOP does fundamentally change the incentives of the union. With an ESOP, the union cares not only about its wage, but also about the firm's profitability, which falls with higher wages and longer and more costly disagreements. As a result, the ESOP makes the union a less demanding negotiator. As we will see, the ESOP gives the union an incentive to select a less destructive threat and to demand a lower initial wage demand.
The bargaining sequence is as follows. Following the union's threat choice the union and the firm alternate making wage offers, with the union assumed to make the initial offer. After a wage offer is made by one side, the other side has two options: (1) make a counteroffer, in which case the bargaining continues, or (2) accept the current offer, in which case the bargaining ends and labor is supplied at the offered wage for the reminder of the contract period. As in Admati and Perry (1987) , a bargainer can delay responding to an offer. This assumption leads to the signaling equilibrium in which the firm signals its value through its willingness to delay the agreement. For simplicity, we assume that the minimum time between offers is arbitrarily small.
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The equilibrium of this bargaining game takes a simple form. If the wage under the expired labor agreement, w 0 , is sufficiently low (that is, below some indifference level w % ) the union decides to select the strike threat; otherwise ( 0 w w ≥ % ) the union selects the holdout threat. for bargaining units with a controlling interest in the firm (α = ½), there is no longer any bargaining conflict between the firm and the union. The union receives a "competitive" wage equal to its threat payoff, x θ . However, the union still collects half of the rents, v -x θ , though it now receives the payment entirely through its equity stake. For intermediate values of α, the union receives some of its rents through the wage and some through its equity stake. Second, during a labor dispute the union has every incentive to impose as much inefficiency on the firm as possible. The wage under both threats increases linearly with the degree of inefficiency, but the strength of this incentive diminishes with α.
For a given threat θ, we can determine how the dispute incidence and duration respond to changes in the distribution of v, changes in the threat payoffs, or to changes in the size of the ESOP. The following proposition says that dispute activity increases with uncertainty. In addition, dispute activity increases when the threat θ becomes more attractive to the union (i.e., c θ falls). However, dispute activity decreases with larger ESOPs (as α rises).
Proposition 2. Suppose that m uniquely maximizes (M). Dispute incidence F(m) and dispute
duration 1 2 ( ) 1 ( ) v c D v m c q a q - + º - +
increase with a linear, mean-preserving spread of the distribution of F. Moreover, dispute incidence and duration decrease as c θ increases and as α increases.
Dispute activity depends on the amount of uncertainty about the firm's private information. Dispute incidence always exceeds one-half, and converges to one-half in the limit as uncertainty disappears. 12 Recall that c θ measures what the firm pays less what the union receives in the threat θ scaled by the dispute cost. Proposition 2 yields several testable predictions. For example, if a local union receives strike benefits throughout a strike from its national union (and the costs of the benefits are spread across the national membership), then this lowers c S which should increase strike incidence and lengthen strike durations. Similarly, if workers on strike qualify for general welfare payments, this also lowers S c and should increase the incidence and duration of strikes.
10
The intuition for why ESOPs reduce dispute incidence and dispute duration stems from the fact that as α increases the union's preferences become more in line with the firm. A bargaining unit without an ESOP receives rents only through the negotiated wage. Labor disputes are a costly activity that allows the union to raise its wage. A bargaining unit with an ESOP no longer collects its rents entirely through the negotiated wage. Depending on the size of the ESOP, a portion of the union's rents is now collected through its ownership stake in the firm.
As the ESOP share α increases, the union collects a higher share of its rents through its equity stake, which dampens the union's incentive to invest in costly labor disputes in order to raise its wage. At α = ½, all of the union's rents are collected through its equity stake and there is nothing left to disagree about. Consequently, dispute incidence and duration vanishes to zero.
Our third proposition demonstrates that the union's threat decision depends critically on the current wage under the expired labor agreement, w 0 . 
Proposition 3. If
(1 )( )(1 ( )) (1 ) (1 ( )) ( (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )) 1 S H S S S S S H H H m m S S S S H l l w x a m c F m a m F m c a F m a vdF v a vdF v α α = + − + − − − − − − + − − − − ∫ ∫ %
and m S = m(c S ) and m H = m(c H ) maximize (M).
The intuition is that the union will select the strike threat if and only if the higher bargaining costs that are associated with a strike are more than made up for by a higher wage. If the current wage under the expired labor agreement is sufficiently high, this is not the case and the union prefers the holdout threat.
Proposition 3 provides a key insight into strike activity. The overall incidence of strikes depends not just on the overall incidence of disputes, but also on the fraction of disputes that involves a strike. As shown earlier, the level of dispute activity depends on the degree of uncertainty and the size of the ESOP. The composition of disputes between strikes and holdouts depends on 0 w , the size of the ESOP, the threat payoffs and the location of the distribution of v.
11
We would like to determine how the size of the ESOP impacts the composition of disputes.
An examination of the Rubinstein wage provides some insight:
We see that as α increases, the wage under both threats falls. However, assuming that the strike threat is much more destructive than the holdout threat (a S << a H ), then it is the case that as the ESOP share increases the wage under the strike threat is falling much faster than the wage under the holdout threat. A higher ESOP share reduces the relative wage gap between the strike and the holdout threats. Hence, we should expect that an ESOP should increase the relative attractiveness of the holdout threat. The incentive to strike is further reduced when the union factors in the dispute costs. The less destructive threat, holdout, results in lower dispute costs.
Thus, our intuition is that we should expect ESOPs to shift the composition of disputes away from strikes.
This intuition is difficult to establish without making further assumptions on the threat payoffs. One useful simplification is
This states that what the firm pays out during a strike is equal to what the union receives implying that c S = 0. 13 In the case of holdout, the firm pays the union the wage from the expired contract, which means b H = x H = w 0 , and c H = 0. Thus, with Assumption S, c H = c S = 0 which implies that the union selects the same cutoff level m under either threat (m = m S = m H ). As a result, the incidence and duration of the dispute is the same under either threat. Since a S < a H , it immediately follows that the expected loss from a strike is higher than the expected loss from a holdout. In addition, we can show
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption S holds and m is the unique maximizer of (M). Then as α increases from 0, w % falls and the union is more apt to choose holdout as the threat. Moreover, if v is uniformly distributed, then for all α, the union's threat choice shifts toward holdout as the size of the ESOP grows.
[add calibration exercise on the size of the ESOP using baseline model from JOLE paper]
ESOP data and empirical findings
Our primary data source for ESOP information was the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO). For each publicly held corporation, we used NCEO data to determine whether an ESOP exists, the date the ESOP was adopted, and the percent of total shares held by the ESOP. The initial data complied from their list of March 1989 and it was augmented by the new list of ESOP companies in November 1992. We sent surveys to 387 corporations where there was any indication of possible error in the NCEO data. These surveys were conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1997 . A total of 268 companies were responded to the survey, although about a third of responses were not informative since the plan administrators claimed that they did not have information about the specific circumstances surrounding the adoption of their ESOPs. We made corrections to the data based on the usable survey responses. In addition, we checked the accuracy of our ESOP data against those reported in Chang and Mayers (1992), Gordon and Pound (1990) , and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994) . Finally, we cross-checked our data with the information provided to the Internal Revenue Service in the Form 5500. 14 We were unable to check the accuracy of ESOPs before 1988 due to the fact that many companies were delisted.
Our final ESOP sample consists of 602 firms.
Our collective bargaining data consists of all major bargaining units followed by the BLS from 1970 to 1995. 15 The BLS compiles settlement, effective, and expiration dates for each round of contract negotiations. Strike beginning and ending dates are from BLS and Bureau of National Affairs data, and consist of compilations from public sources. A total of 1,284 bargaining units and 8,665 negotiations are captured in the data used in the estimation. CUSIP 13 numbers were merged in using the firm name(s) listed by the BLS and data sources on mergers and acquisitions during the sample period.
We merged the sample of ESOPs into our collective bargaining data using the firm's CUSIP number. It should be noted that this has a nontrivial impact on sample construction. The reason is that in addition to mergers and acquisitions, which has its own impact on ESOP If the firm is being acquired then the treatment of its ESOP is similar to a 40(k) plan --the assets would be moved into a successor plan, usually a 401(k) in the acquirer. That plan might sell the shares if it is a large percentage of the acquirer s stock. Alternatively, the shares could be cashed out and employees could roll them into an IRA or pay taxes and keep the money, or the employees could simply be given the shares.
17 A company that sells a division has a few options: (a) without affirmative employer action, the affected employees are treated as any terminated employees. The vested employees can then receive distributions pursuant to the plan's general provisions and unvested employees forfeit. (b) the company could choose to vest all, and otherwise treat the employees under (a) above. (c) the employer could retain the funds in the ESOP, and give continuing vesting service for employment with the buyer. Under any of a, b, or c, the employer might also facilitate rollovers to the buyer's plan (after liquidating the stock). In a different direction the seller could implement a "trust-to-trust" transfer to the buyer's plan (again, with or without fully vesting--but usually after vesting). If a trust-to-trust transfer occurs, the buyer can either retain the stock fund (but freeze it) to enable the participants to retain favorable tax treatment (on net unrealized appreciation) upon distribution. However, most employers would prefer to liquidate the stock fund quickly. It should be noted that a partial termination requires full vesting. A partial termination occurs if a significant percentage of a plan's population is terminated as the result of employer action. Over 50% termination is always a partial termination, under 20% is never a partial termination and anything between 20% and 50% is subject to evaluation based on facts and circumstances.
14 additional background detail, we used Securities Data Corporation data on asset sell-offs for restructuring in the 90s, Moody's Manuals, 10-Ks filed with the SEC, and Directory of Corporate Affiliates.
The pattern of adoption of ESOPs over time in our data is presented in Table 1 . Of the 142 total ESOP plans that we linked to our bargaining data, around 2% were put into place in the year following the passage of ERISA. In the early to mid-1980s some ESOPs were put into place as part of concession bargaining by the firm. 19 Adoption rates significantly picked up in 1989, following the enhancement of some of the ESOP tax incentives and the Polaroid decision.
Overall, ESOPs were adopted by 12% of the bargaining units in our data. A total of 88% of contract negotiations involve firms that never adopt an ESOP. For the bargaining units involving firms that adopt an ESOP, the negotiations prior to the adoption date represent 11% of the total sample, while the negotiations following the adoption date represent only 1%.
Restricting attention to the firms adopting ESOPs, 92% of their negotiations occur prior to the adoption date. The fact that many ESOPs are adopted late in our sample period will make estimating their impact on bargaining more difficult due to the shortage of post-adoption negotiations. Table 2 gives the distribution of ESOPs across broad industry classifications. The incidence of adoption among unionized firms is not uniform across industry classifications, and is relatively high in Petroleum & Coal and Transportation Equipment. Bell and Kruse (1995) using Form 5500 data find that the overall incidence of ESOPs was 72.7% in Communications, 39.2% in Utilities, 11.3% in Manufacturing, and 11.7% in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.
Bell and Kruse report that the incidence of ESOP adoption is three times higher in "high technology" sectors than for the private sector as a whole.
A simple tabulation of the incidence of strikes and labor disputes by ESOP status is provided in Table 3 . In this table we report strike incidence, dispute incidence, and the composition of disputes by ESOP status. The overall incidence of labor disputes in our sample is 49%, while the incidence of strikes is 12%. Only about a quarter of labor disputes involve a strike. Comparing the pre-ESOP outcomes with the post-ESOP outcomes we see that strike incidence falls, dispute incidence rises and the fraction of disputes that involve a strike falls quite dramatically.
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We can use the tabulations in Table 3 to calculate a rough estimate of the impact of ESOPs on collective bargaining outcomes. Recall that most of our ESOPs were adopted after 1988. We can see from the pre-1989 and post-1989 breakdown of the sample of negotiations without ESOPs that there were important time trends in collective bargaining outcomes. Both the incidence of strikes and the fraction of disputes involving a strike were declining, while the incidence of labor disputes was rising. For any of the three bargaining outcomes, taking the difference in the post-ESOP and pre-ESOP outcomes and subtracting the difference in the post-1989 and pre-1989 outcomes gives a simple estimate of the ESOP effect. These ESOP impacts are provided in the last row of Table 3 . The tabulations suggest that the impact of ESOPs line up directionally with the predictions of the model: ESOPs lower strike incidence, lower dispute incidence and lower the fraction of disputes that involve a strike.
The simple difference in difference estimates that are reported in Table 3 provide at best only a rough idea of the likely impact of ESOPs on collective bargaining outcomes. To investigate further the impact of ESOPs on the collective bargaining process, we estimate strike incidence, dispute incidence and dispute composition specifications using conditional logit models. These specifications allow us to control more precisely for cyclical effects on bargaining, changes in bargaining patterns over time, and factors specific to each bargaining unit that impact bargaining outcomes.
All of our logit specifications control for cyclical patterns in bargaining using aggregate, industry and local labor market controls. Aggregate cyclical conditions are captured by a set of year effects. These year effects will also control for changes in bargaining trends over time.
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Conditions in the industry and state labor markets are proxied by a set of employment residuals.
We fit regression models to the BLS quarterly unadjusted industry and state-level employment series for the period 1970-1995. We allow for quadratic trends, quarterly seasonal effects, and autoregressive error terms. 20 For example, strike incidence has declined by roughly 50% over this twenty-five year period.
where ln E it is log quarterly employment in industry/state i at time t; Q j is an indicator variable for the j th quarter; φ(L) is a second-order distributed lag polynomial; and ε it is a white noise error term.
We measure the tightness in the relevant labor market using the estimated quarterly employment residual, U it . We also include the estimated current employment growth rate (∃ i1 +2 ∃ i2 t) as a measure of longer-term performance in the industry or state.
We take the panel nature of the data into account in the estimation by controlling for bargaining unit fixed effects. For those bargaining units that adopt an ESOP, we include a preand post-adoption indicator in the specification. We measure the impact of ESOPs on bargaining outcomes by taking the difference between the pre-and post-adoption coefficient estimates. This approach does not constrain the bargaining units that adopt ESOPs to negotiate like the nonadopting bargaining units prior to putting the ESOP in place.
The overall impact of ESOPs on strikes is given in specification (1) of Table 4 . The data indicate that bargaining units that are associated with firms that adopt ESOPs were 5.9
percentage points less likely to experience a labor dispute in the pre-adoption period relative to bargaining units at firms that never adopt an ESOP. Following the adoption of an ESOP, the strike incidence for adopting bargaining units declines by another 8 percentage points. Similarly, specification (2) suggests that ESOP bargaining units experienced on average a 6.7 percentage point lower dispute rate prior to the adoption of the ESOP. Following the establishment of the ESOP, these same bargaining units experienced an additional 5.6 percentage point decline in their dispute rate. Finally, as indicated in specification (3), ESOP bargaining units were more likely to select the strike threat during contract negotiations that were conducted prior to the ESOP. Following the establishment of the ESOP, the fraction of disputes that involved a strike declined by 18.1 percentage points. These ESOP impacts are all larger than the naïve estimates reported in Table 3 . However, the data is unable to precisely measure any of these three impacts.
The evidence, though, is suggestive that ESOPs do alter the relative attractiveness of the union's two threat choices inducing the union to substitute away from strikes and towards holdouts.
The analysis so far has examined the overall impact of ESOPs on collective bargaining outcomes regardless of the size of the ESOP. To investigate whether the effects of ESOPs differ
by size, we classify ESOPs into large and small size categories based on whether the ESOP owns at least 8.5% of the firm's equity. This threshold is the median ESOP size in our sample. Table 5 reexamines the impact of ESOPs on collective bargaining outcomes but allows for differential effects across the two size categories. The reduction in strike and dispute rates following the adoption of an ESOP is more pronounced for small ESOPs. In contrast, the impact of ESOPs on the composition of labor disputes is driven entirely by large ESOPs. The effect of ESOP size on the composition of labor disputes is given in specification (3) of Table 5 . We saw in Table 4 that bargaining units that adopt an ESOP experienced on average a higher fraction of disputes involving a strike in the pre-adoption period. We see in specification (3) of Table 5 that this is true for both small and large ESOPs. Following the adoption of the ESOP, the bargaining units with a large ESOP experienced on average a 33.6 percentage point decline in the fraction of their disputes that took the form of a strike. This is a large swing in the composition of disputes.
21 Again, the paucity of post-ESOP contract negotiations makes it difficult to pin down the post-adoption dispute composition marginal effect. The point estimate, though, suggests that larger ESOPs may substantially alter the relative attractiveness of the strike versus the holdout threat.
Shareholder and Labor Wealth Effects
In this section, we analyze the wealth effects of an ESOP adoption announcement on shareholders as well as labor. While the market reaction to an announcement of a new ESOP has been documented in the literature, we provide new evidence on the announcement gains/losses disaggregated by the collective bargaining status of the firm. If ESOPs improve the efficiency of contract negotiations and if these efficiency gains are shared between the union and the firm, then we would expect to see these gains capitalized into the announcement effect of a union ESOP. We measure these announcement effects using an event-time methodology as described in MacKinaly (1997). We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over three intervals around the announcement date of ESOP. We also normalize the gain or loss by the number of employees to find out the average gain/loss to each worker.
22 21 Bargaining units that adopt a large ESOP have a pre-adoption dispute rate of 35.3%. 22 We take the number of employees for the year of ESOP adoption for each firm as reported by the Standard Table 6 provides descriptive statistics on the firms in our ESOP sample. We report information on firm size (measured by the book value of assets and employment), growth opportunities (measure by market to book ratio), and the size of the ESOP as a percentage of shares outstanding. Our sample of ESOP firms on average has nearly $5.0 billions in assets.
Unionized firms, with an average size of $10.6 billion are about 3.4 times larger than the nonunionized firms. An average firm in our ESOP sample has about 21,000 employees. The unionized firms have workforces that are double the size of the non-unionized firms. Firms that adopt an ESOP have a mean (median) market to book of 1.3 (1.2), indicating growth prospects.
Unionized firms have a slightly higher market to book than non-unionized firms. ESOPs on average have 11.6% of the firm's shares outstanding, with a median equity stake of 8.0%.
Appendix B provides information on the name of the company, the year of ESOP adoption and percentage shares outstanding in the plan for our sample of union ESOPs. Table 7 reports the event study results. We report CARs for three event windows (-5,5), (-5,1), and (-2,1), where t = -1 is the ESOP announcement date, and t = 0 is the date the announcement is reported in the press. For two of the event windows, we include the five days prior to the press release to capture any leakage of the news to the markets, although little is reported in the literature as to when the firm, if at all, shares the information with its employees about the ESOP. CARs for the overall sample of firms are positive and statistically significant over each of the three intervals. The eleven-day CAR (-5, 5) and the seven-day CAR (-5,1) are 1.6% and 1.5% respectively, while the four-day CAR (-2,1) is 1.3%.
Since our sample is different than those in other studies, we compare the announcement returns with findings in three other papers. Our calculated four-day return of 1.3%, is a bit higher than that of and Chang and Mayers (1992) , but is much lower than Chang (1990) as reported below. These studies differ because of the type of ESOPs included in the sample.
Beatty points out that Chang's reported excess return of 3.7% would be reduced to 1.6% if the 35 leveraged buyout ESOPs were excluded from his sample. Thus, our announcement return is roughly comparable to other studies.
Study Sample Size Sample Period CARs
Beatty (1995) Chang (1990) Chang and Mayers (1992) 122 165 276 1976-1989 1976-1987 1976-1989 1.0% 3.7% 0.7% Table 7 also reports CARs disaggregated by the union status of the firm. For the 120 nonunionized firms, the CARs are slightly smaller for the overall sample of firms. The CARs for the 27 unionized firms are around fifty percent larger than for the nonunion sample. For the unionized firms, the CARs are 2.4% for the interval (-5,5), 2.3% for the interval (-5,1), and 1.7%
for the interval (-2,1).
In order to gain additional insights into these results, we further divide the sample of unionized firms by whether or not the ownership share in their ESOP is greater or less than 8.5%. We find a sharp contrast in the announcement effects for unionized firms depending on the size of the ESOP. For unionized firms that adopt small ESOPs (< 8.5%), there is no significant market reaction to the ESOP announcement. In contrast, for unionized firms that adopt large ESOPs (> 8.5%), the market reaction is quite strong. The CARs in these cases range from 3.3%
to 3.9% depending on the event window. 23 Whatever the benefits are to firms in general from establishing an ESOP, the benefits are considerably larger for unionized firms, and in particular for unionized firms that establish large ESOPs. 24 To our knowledge, this feature of the data has not been previously noted in the literature. 
Conclusion
Firms and unions that repeatedly negotiate labor contracts have an incentive to adopt 23 For the sample of nonunion firms, there is no difference in announcement effects between large and small ESOPs. 24 To check the robustness of the results, we used a 5% size cutoff for the ESOPs. With this lower size cutoff, the overall findings qualitatively remain the same.
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forms of compensation that minimize the renegotiation costs. The adoption of multi-year contracts with prespecified deferred payments and a cost-of-living clause is one example. By extending the contract duration the costs of renegotiation can be amortized over a longer time period. Similarly, ESOPs may alter the incentives of the firm and union in ways that help to minimize the frequency and costs of labor disputes. Given the recent growth of ESOPs for unionized firms, the impact of ESOPs on the collective bargaining process is an important item for research.
In this paper, we argue that ESOPs may lead to lower dispute rates, and fewer strikes as a fraction of total disputes. The presence of an ESOP changes the incentives of the union since it no longer collects its rents exclusively through the negotiated wage. We examine the impact of ESOPs on collective bargaining outcomes by extending the signaling model of Cramton and Tracy (1992) to allow the union to hold an equity stake in the firm. The model predicts that increasing the size of the union's equity stake acts to more closely align the union's interests with the interests of the firm. A consequence is a reduction in labor disputes and a shift by the union away from the strike threat and towards the holdout threat.
Using data on major collective bargaining negotiations from 1970-1995, we find evidence consistent with the prediction that ESOPs reduce the overall incidence of strikes and labor disputes. For large ESOPs, the data also suggest that ESOPs shift the composition of disputes away from strikes and toward holdouts. These findings indicate that ESOPs may provide firms and unions with a tool to improve the efficiency with which they renegotiate labor agreements. A more complete picture requires more data on post-ESOP contract negotiations and detailed information on pre-and post-ESOP wage settlements. [8, 665] 12.1 49.4 24.5
No ESOP [7, 663] 11.9 50.3 23.6
Pre -1989 [6,084] Notes: ESOP announcement day (t = -1). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. CARs estimated using the market model discussed in MacKinlay (1997) . Parameters of the model are calculated using returns over the period -260 to -61 and 61 to 260. ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level Appendix A
The proofs of Propositions 1-3 are extensions of similar propositions in Cramton and Tracy (1992) . As a result only a sketch of the proofs are given.
Proof of Proposition 1. We begin by establishing the Rubinstein wage when the union has an ESOP of size α. Then the payoffs during the threat θ and after settlement are as shown in Figure   1 . The Rubinstein wage is determined from a pair of indifference relations, which require the firm offers a wage f w and union offers wage u w , such that each is indifferent between immediate acceptance of the other's offer or waiting and having the other accept their offer after a period of delay. Let δ be the discount factor between offers. Then the indifference relations for the union and firm are (
Solving for the wage offers yields
Finally, letting the time between offers go to zero ( 1 δ → ), gives us the Rubinstein wage for the threat θ: The firm selects the delay ∆ to maximize its profits: ( (1 2 )(1 ( )) (1 2 )( ) ( ) (1 2 )( ) ( ) (1 2 ) ( ) U ′ is a continuous function, the maximum occurs at an interior point m such that the first-order condition is satisfied. In addition, the second-order condition must also be satisfied, so Finally, we wish to show that a linear mean-preserving spread of the distribution F increases both dispute incidence and dispute duration. This follows, because a linear mean-preserving spread of the distribution is equivalent to a rescaling of the original problem with a smaller c θ . Hence, both dispute incidence and duration increase from the calculations above.
Proof of Proposition 3. The union will select the threat that maximizes its expected payoff. Using the first order condition, yields the following equation for its expected payoff: 
